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BOOK REVIEW

Oh, But It Doesn't Have to be that Way
FATAL SUBTRACTION: THE INSIDE STORY OF BUCHWALD V. PAR-

AMOUNT. By Pierce O'Donnell and Dennis McDougal. New

York, NY: DOUBLEDAY, 1992. Pp. 577 Hardbound. $25.00.
Reviewed by Dennis P. Lilly*
This book is an entertaining and very readable account of
one of the film industry's most notable recent lawsuits. It is
the plaintiffs' story of what happened when world famous,
Pulitzer Prize winning journalist Art Buchwald, and his
friend, producer Alain Bernheim, sued Paramount over star
comic Eddie Murphy's blockbuster film "Coming to America."
They claimed that Paramount had based the film on their
material and had denied them both the credit and an estimated $5,000,000 in fixed and contingent compensation they
could have earned. These authors are particularly qualified
to chronicle the case: Mr. O'Donnell handled the litigation for
the plaintiffs, and Mr. McDougal covered the case extensively
throughout its course for the Los Angeles Times.
The case took over three years to move from inception in
November 1988 to the final trial decision in March 1992.
There were more than 13 months of pretrial activity, and
then three separate trial phases before Judge Harvey A.
Schneider of the Los Angeles County Superior Court. Paramount only recently filed its long-awaited appeal. Interest in
the case ran high, both among lawyers and industry insiders
and also with the general public. As befits a "Hollywood
story" intended for a general readership, the narrative is filled with special appearances by executives, celebrities, and
prominent professionals from the film industry, consulting,
© 1994 by Dennis P. Lilly. All rights reserved.
* Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law. Professor
Lilly's areas of emphasis are taxation, corporations, and entertainment law.
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participating in trial preparation, testifying or maneuvering
behind the scenes.
I enjoyed reading this book. It not only provides an intriguing insight into the conduct of civil litigation at the highest levels of American business, but also delivers on its promotional promise: to expose "How Hollywood Really Does
Business." To that end it is thorough in detailing how the
plaintiffs' case developed, and there are extensive discussions
of some of the strategy and tactics plaintiffs' team employed.
Unfortunately, Paramount's side is not included, leading
to speculation about their thinking as the case progressed.
Some of the portraits painted of Paramount executives, employees and representatives are unflattering. But viewing
the case through the prism of only one side enhances the
drama and suspense, as we await, with the plaintiffs, the
punches and counterpunches we can only speculate the Paramount opponents will throw. The book tells a very good
story, of Davids standing up to Goliaths, besting them in arduous struggles on legal point after legal point, only to have
financial victory snatched from their hands at the very end.
This story would have made an excellent novel, and a very
good film as well; the themes are certainly not new in fiction
or in Hollywood.
However, this case involved real people and companies in
a titanic struggle that could have been avoided. And to this
point the plaintiffs have not succeeded in their quest to have
Hollywood's routine treatment of talent overturned. This litigation has been neither efficient nor effective in achieving
the plaintiffs' goals of personal vindication and studio reform.
This case so far has consumed enormous amounts of time and
money without resolving definitively either the underlying
legal or economic issues involved. And the public may continue to believe that the studios routinely and intentionally
mistreat their most important human resources, the talent
who create the films.
For their part, the studios could avoid most of these lawsuits by modifying current practices somewhat, at no substantial cost to themselves either financially or in terms of
ultimate control. The mechanisms are readily apparent in
the arrangements other companies use with employees and
independent contractors for control of work product and for
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contingent compensation. The studios could easily employ
comparable approaches.
THE CASE

The narrow subjects of this litigation were the separate
contracts plaintiffs entered into with Paramount in 1983. Art
Buchwald had written a treatment for a film about the adventures of an African prince who finds himself lost in the
United States; Alain Bernheim, his friend of many years, had
agreed to produce if a film were developed from this treatment. Each entered into a written contract with Paramount
providing for credit and compensation if Paramount chose to
develope a film "based upon" Art Buchwald's material. Under
the contracts, each would be paid a fixed amount and each
would also have a "net profits participation," promising them
a share in the film's "net profits," as defined in the contract, if
there were any.
After working with the material for some time and
spending several hundred thousand dollars on it, Paramount
apparently dropped the project. The plaintiffs then took the
idea to other studios. Warner Brothers showed an interest,
but dropped the project when it was learned that Paramount
was developing a similar film for Eddie Murphy. Thus it appeared that there would be no film made from the Buchwald/
Bernheim material.
Then in the summer of 1988 Paramount released the
very successful "Coming to America," starring Eddie Murphy,
a comedian heavily courted by, and under contract to, Paramount. The film recounted the adventures of an African
prince lost in America, but gave neither credit nor compensation to either Mr. Buchwald or Mr. Bernheim. They were incensed; they believed that Paramount had in fact based the
film on their submission, and that they had been improperly
left out. After some maneuverings, including difficulties in
finding an appropriate lawyer who was willing to risk the
wrath of the studios by prosecuting the case, the plaintiffs
came to Mr. O'Donnell and his firm, and the lawsuit chronicled in this book followed.
At its basic level, this case dealt with the way the large
studios treat creative talent. Plaintiffs' situations are portrayed as typical in the business, examples of the routine
abuse of creative talent, especially writers. First, the stu-
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dios-so goes the perception-obtain access to the writer's
material; here Paramount obtained access by way of the contracts with plaintiffs. Then the studio will deny having used
the material. If forced to acknowledge use, the studio will try
to minimize the writer's pay by forcing him or her (except at
the very top or bottom layers of the talent pyramid) to agree
to contingent compensation provisions, the "net profits" participation, which effectively preclude any such compensation
in almost all situations. Thus the creative people believe
themselves exploited, underpaid, and manipulated.
The authors report that the plaintiffs and their lawyers
viewed this case as a crusade against the monolithic
Hollywood studios, especially after Paramount took a hard
line in negotiations. If there were a settlement, it would have
to be public. If a lawsuit was needed, that battle would be
waged on behalf of the entire Hollywood creative community.
The idea seems to have been that clear legal rulings on when
a studio has used material, coupled with a very substantial
money judgment, would force Paramount and the other studios to change their ways of dealing with creative talent.1
Both sides geared up for a titanic campaign, to be conducted
not only in and about the courtroom, but also by way of private meetings and contacts and through the media which eagerly covered the unfolding drama.
Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, the case has not, as yet,
turned out their way. Whatever the promise of the case may
have been at inception, Judge Schneider's decisions did not
overturn the established industry practices in fundamental
ways, and they could make it harder for future claimants to
mount successful challenges. 2 Unless the pending appeal
1. What were not attacked in this case were the general accounting principles and standards used in film industry accounting. These include often subjective estimates and allocations of revenues and costs, for individual films and
for packages of films. It is therefore difficult to analyze any financial information released by film companies, even when prepared and presented fully in
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles as applied in this industry. In addition, all the companies view the specific results of specific films
to be highly confidential. In fact, Paramount abandoned part of its defense in
this case when an audit by an outsider of some of its specific financial results
was about to be ordered.
2. See Dan Cox, "Batman' Case May Sting Suits," DAILY VARIE'Y, Jan. 26,
1994, at 3. However, on September 26, 1994 a Los Angeles state court jury
returned a verdict of $7,300,000 for a screenwriter who contended that MCA
had improperly used his screenplay in creating the TV hit show "Northern Exposure." See John Horn, Concept for TV's "Exposure" Stolen, L.A. Jury Rules,
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makes some major changes, this book can still be looked upon
as an accurate description of "How Hollywood Really Does
Business."
LIMITATIONS ON THE CASE'S IMPACT

At the outset this case appeared to have the potential to
seriously upset long standing, staunchly defended studio
practices. The plaintiffs were ideal. The issues were clear.
Plaintiffs had contracts with Paramount. Paramount's film
"Coming to America" had clearly produced millions of dollars
for the studio, and the plaintiffs had received none. Yet even
from the beginning, beneath these appearances the case had
only limited potential to alter fundamentally the industry's
treatment of most writers. And the court's decisions further
limited the case's impact on the studios, and thus the creative
talent who must deal with them.
Art Buchwald was certainly one of the writers best able
to take on the studios. He was already world famous, very
visible; any complaints he made would receive wide publicity. In addition, he did not need to write for Hollywood for a
living. His position of independence and influence is very different from that of the usual writer: he could afford a campaign on principle which those who depended on future writing assignments from the studios could not.
Mr. Buchwald's situation was unusual in one other respect. Despite his fame and renown as a writer, he had no
successful track record of writing for films. Accordingly, his
contract was more or less the standard form for a neophyte
writer, with the addition of the contingent compensation "net
profits" provisions. Established writers for Hollywood might
command stronger, improved contractual provisions which
could have obviated the complaints raised in this case.
At the same time the simple fact that these plaintiffs had
written contracts at all limited the potential impact of this
crusade. Most writers claiming studio misuse of their material do not. Since the case turned on the interpretation of a
contract, it is not, and could not have been, immediately helpful to all those writers who submit materials without a preexisting written agreement. In fact it may now have become
Sep. 27, 1994, at Al. On the surface both cases appear similar to
the Buchwald litigation. Perhaps a jury would have been more generous to Mr.
Buchwald and Mr. Bernheim than Judge Schneider turned out to be.
S.J. MERCURY,
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harder for a writer who does not have a well known agent or
attorney to get any studio review of his or her work.
In another respect, the court limited the case's impact by
restricting the potential recovery a plaintiff can expect in this
type of suit. Judge Schneider declined to entertain assertions
of breach of fiduciary duty or tort theories which might have
supported exemplary damages. Moreover, in determining the
damages to be awarded, the court focused on what comparable people in comparable situations might have earned for
their work. Thus the plaintiffs were awarded a total of
$900,000, when, according to the authors, over $2,000,000 in
costs and the value of legal services had been accrued by the
plaintiffs' side through the trial level. With the appeal now in
process, the case is still far from over.
THE FIRST ISSUE: "BASED UPON"

In this phase of the case the court first held the contracts
valid and enforceable. Thus the plaintiffs could recover
under their contracts if Paramount's film were "based upon"
their submissions. But the contracts contained no definition
for "based upon," leaving the court adrift to determine the
meaning of the term as used in these contracts.
Judge Schneider sought to establish what the custom
and usage of the industry might be with respect to what the
term meant in contracts like these. But after listening to the
several experts presented by both sides, he concluded there
was no established industry custom and usage for the term.
He then determined that the proper source for an analytical
framework or legal standard in this case would be the federal
copyright rules for determining when a copyright infringement has taken place. Applying that framework, focusing on
the defendant's access to plaintiffs' work and the degree of
similarity between the two works, the judge concluded that
"Coming to America" was in fact "based upon" Mr. Buchwald's work.
Regardless of whether the court's use of federal copyright
law analogues was appropriate, under that standard or any
other available standard the court would have to conduct a
detailed inquiry into the particular facts and circumstances
3. See Marcus, Buchwald v. ParamountPictures Corp. and the Future of
Net Profit, 9 CARDozo ARTS & ENr. L.J. 545, 555 n.65 (1991).

FATAL SUBTRACTION

1994]

403

presented. The parties will necessarily have to engage in extensive and expensive fact investigation, development and
presentation. While that may be true of many other cases as
well, the result of this pretrial and trial work will remain unpredictable under the inherently amorphous available standards. Future plaintiffs could well be discouraged by this scenario, and conversely studio defendants could be encouraged
to take a hard line in defending these cases.
The obvious solution for most of these situations would
be to define, clearly and in advance, when a film will be
deemed "based upon" preexisting material. When a writer
has a contract with the studio, as in the present case, the
contract should contain a full definition. If a dispute arose
the court would be interpreting very different contract language than the skimpy "based upon" language standing
alone. For writers who do not have the protection of a preexisting written contract, a studio's publication of standards for
"based upon" would identify its practices on the issue if not
the practices of the broader industry. One might hope that if
one studio moved to clarify its usage, the others would not be
far behind. The Writers Guild, representing writers, could
also seek better practices and language from the studios in
this area. Even though the studios seem to win most of these
disputes, 4 a good-faith attempt to amplify, standardize and
publicize their practices here can only improve the writers'
present perception of the studios.
THE SECOND ISsUE: NET PROFITS

After ruling in Phase 1 of the case that "Coming to
America" was based upon Mr. Buchwald's work, the court
turned to the determination of the damages to be awarded to
plaintiffs for Paramount's breach of contract. Under the contracts, if Paramount used Mr. Buchwald's material it was
obliged to compensate him and Mr. Bernheim. The fixed
compensation was small, but the contract also provided for
contingent compensation in the form of a "net profits" participation. Whether the plaintiffs would actually receive any
contingent compensation would depend on a calculation of
"net profits," a term defined at great length and in great detail in the contract. Regardless of the actual financial results
4. Id. at 555-57.
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of the film, plaintiffs would be entitled to contingent compensation only if the contractual calculation produced a positive
amount.
Participations of any kind can lower the up-front costs of
film production for the studios by deferring part of the agreed
cost for talent until the film produces revenues. They may
also act as incentives for the participants to perform at exceptional levels in the film, or to advance some other interest
of the studio and the participant. They may take the form of
gross participations, becoming due and payable from early
dollars earned by the film; Eddie Murphy and the director,
John Landis, had gross participations in "Coming to
America." Mr. Buchwald's and Mr. Bernheim's participation
were net profits participations, which are payable from virtually the last receipts from the film. Gradations along the way
from first gross to residual net profits are limited only by the
negotiating clout of the individual involved and the ingenuity
of the negotiators. Few can command any type of gross participation. More, but still relatively few, can command even a
net profits participation. The likelihood of any payout from a
participation, assuming a successful picture, depends on how
far down the way from first gross to residual net profits the
participant is, how many others are ahead of that particular
participant and what their particular participations are.
When a participant is in the plaintiffs' position, with an expensive film, expensive marketing costs, and several sizable
gross participations ahead of them, it is unlikely that even a
major blockbuster film will generate net profits under the
contractual definition. This phenomenon may have caused
Eddie Murphy to refer to net profits participations as "monkey points," and permitted Paramount to assert that "Coming
To America," with total revenues of more than $300,000,000,
still had not generated any "net profits" for Mr. Buchwald
and Mr. Bernheim.
Thus, having succeeded in upholding the applicability of
the contracts in Phase 1 of the case, the plaintiffs now had to
overcome some of the terms of their contracts or step outside
the contractual language if they were to obtain any contingent compensation. To that end Mr. O'Donnell then mounted
what proved to be a successful attack on the net profits provisions themselves, arguing that they were unconscionable.
Judge Schneider agreed, but only in part. He ruled that sev-
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eral specific provisions in the net profits definitions were unconscionable. However, he did not void the provisions as a
whole, or rule that the entire concept of contingent compensation by way of a contractually defined net profits approach
was unconscionable. Moreover, he left the burden of proof
with respect to each specific provision on the plaintiffs. Thus,
in the final analysis Judge Schneider merely set aside specific
aspects of the calculation which plaintiffs could persuade him
were inappropriate. And even with these changes, it was by
no means certain that the calculation would produce any
amounts for the plaintiffs.
As it turned out, in determining the actual amounts to be
awarded as damages for the plaintiffs, Judge Schneider chose
not to engage in an attempted calculation under the contracts. Rather, he determined what would be fair compensation for the plaintiffs based on probable payouts to similarly
situated people for similar films: a mere $150,000 for Mr.
Buchwald and $750,000 for Mr. Bernheim. In part this reflected the court's perception that a windfall, totally out of
proportion to the actual contributions of the plaintiffs to the
finished film, should be avoided. In fact neither Mr. Buchwald nor Mr. Bernheim had done any additional direct work
on the production of "Coming To America."
These results can hardly encourage future net profits
participants to pursue litigation to the point of a court decision. Assuming an affirmance on appeal, the studios can continue to insist on their net profits provisions, with some modifications to address the specific problems Judge Schneider
found, and can expect courts to approve and enforce them in
future cases. The changes required by the court would not
necessarily alter the reality that the basic structure of the
"net profits" calculation in the contracts usually will not produce any amount for the "net profits" participants. At the
least the studios might expect subsequent courts to agree
with Judge Schneider that only an amount constituting a
"reasonable" level of compensation should be awarded to
those who do not actually work on the finished film.5
5. Opting for a jury trial could make a major difference. See supra note 2
and accompanying text. Plaintiffs in the Buchwald case chose not to have a
jury trial, based on their evaluation of Judge Schneider's sophistication about
film industry practices and on their perception that Eddie Murphy could have
had a devastating influence on a jury.
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These results are unfortunate, because the case could
have produced a very healthy reexamination of the studios'
approach to talent compensation. There is no need for an arrangement that engenders suspicion and mistrust of the studios, when simple, straightforward alternatives for executive
compensation and participation are readily available in many
other industries. In fact, the studios could start by looking at
the incentive contracts they provide for some of their own executives. It should be easy to develope standard arrangements which would trigger incentive compensation amounts
of negotiated size upon the occurence of external, objectively
determinable events, as in many other industries. These do
not have to involve any proprietary revelations or disclosures
by the studios of actual financial results: while not ideal, the
publicly reported U.S. theatrical box office figures could be
used as a starting point in a formula to derive a series of
amounts to serve as triggers. The ingenuity that created and
defends the current "net profits" complexity should be able to
identify appropriate alternatives without much trouble.
Even the term "net profits" is unnecessarily obtuse. It
should be changed, as, apparently, some studios have already
done. The term suggests a participation in the film's actual
financial results, perhaps even as determined under generally accepted accounting principles. That would be appropriate for financial investors in the film, but misrepresents the
intent of the provisions when used currently to provide additional, contingent compensation to talent who are already receiving payment for their personal services on the film. Financial, equity investors receive a return from the film for
taking on the risk of loss in providing funding which may not
be returned; theirs is an investment function, and their return should be based, more or less, on the actual performance
of the film. 6 Creative talent, on the other hand, do not bear a
6. The publicly syndicated limited partnership film investment arrangements used in the 1980s provide examples of returns to investors being dependent on the results of the specific films involved. On one level the return to
investors included amounts calculated from "net profits" as defined in the investment documents. The structure of those definitions was similar to the provisions of the talent contracts, but the function was clearly different, and the
provisions were often supplemented so that the investors had alternative
sources for a financial return on their investments. Still, those investors could
believe that their definitions of "net profits" were also artificial, and distorted
in favor of the studios. But they presumably were advised by counsel on the
meaning of the provisions and the potential payout, and presumably had a
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financial risk of loss: they have been paid for their services,
and any contingent compensation represents a bonus for
their work when the film happens to be unusually successful.
In the case of talent, these provisions merely determine the
timing and amount, if any, of the contingent compensation
for work already done; they do not represent a return on a
financial investment. It can thus be argued that talent with
"net profits" participations should only receive amounts when
all of the financial investors and others with greater clout
have been fully covered. Obviously, there may be some calculation of a trade-off if a person agrees to a smaller fixed fee in
exchange for a participation. But, since it is well known that
"net profits" participations rarely pay off, the creative person
should give up very little, if anything, in fixed compensation
when offered such a participation In any event, talent contingent compensation provisions should not be cast in terms specifically appropriate for an actual equity investment in the
film.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

According to the authors, only after plaintiffs won the
first phase of the court case, i.e. when the court held that
"Coming to America" was in fact "based upon" their work, did
anyone actually attempt to quantify precisely the plaintiffs'
potential net profits compensation. At that point the authors
profess surprise at the realization that the calculation provided in the contracts' would probably never produce any net
profits for the plaintiffs, regardless of the ultimate revenues
from the film. As indicated above, that conclusion should not
have been a surprise. It was widely understood throughout
the industry that very few films could ever produce net profits for the participants under the standard contractual definitions. These provisions had been the subject of articles, seminars and7 forums for years, within and outside the film
business.
choice of investing or not. Creative talent who are dependent on the studios for
employment may believe they do not have that choice, whether or not they have
access to professional counsel.
7. See Kenneth Ziffren and Richard Zimbert, Motion Picture Participations, Syllabus on Participations in the Motion Picture, Television and Music
Industries, Entertainment Law Institute Twenty-Seventh Annual Program, 10394 (1981); Leon Brachman and David Nochimson, Contingent Compensation
for Theatrical Motion Pictures, Entertainment Law Institute Thirty-First An-
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Rather, what is surprising in this scenario is that no one
on the plaintiffs' side would have evaluated the potential payoff under the contracts long before embarking on the litigation and the extensive (and expensive) pretrial work it entailed. Exact figures might not have been possible prior to
some disclosures by Paramount. Nonetheless, estimates at
various revenue levels should have been feasible for the potential return to net profits participants in plaintiffs' positions in a film with these characteristics, i.e. a high budget,
top level talent with gross participation deals, and very wide,
very expensive theatrical distribution. It is curious that a
thorough investigation of potential payoff did not precede the
decisions to commence the lawsuit. But it certainly produced
a more exciting and dramatic story.
For me there is a degree of sadness in reading this otherwise entertaining account of a titanic legal contest. At face
value, Mr. Buchwaldundertook this litigation as a matter of
principle, to vindicate his rights to credit and compensation
for making a contribution to "Coming to America." Plaintiffs
and their team fought the good fight against a mighty adversary. They won their legal victories. But if this decision
stands on appeal, they have lost an enormous amount in economic terms. And they have failed to overturn the standard
practices of the studios, either with respect to their basic
treatment of writers and others seeking to have their material considered, or with respect to the usual contingent compensation, the net profits participation, for talent who are
able to get any provision at all in their contracts. It's unfortunate if the first thorough court examination of these practices
in many years results in simply more business as usual, because "how Hollywood really does business" in these respects
is neither a good way nor a necessary way to run this
business.

nual Program, 1-166 (1985); Peter J. Dekom, Motion Picture Cash-Flow Analysis-1986: From Gross to Net And Back Again, in Counseling Clients in the
Entertainment Industry, 257-97 (1986).

